Adriana 

Renero

Philosopher

Photo by Pau Treviño, 2018

About me

I am currently a Research Scholar in New York University, Philosophy Department as well as an Affiliated Research Scholar in the Philosophy of Mind at the Saul Kripke Center in the City University of New York (CUNY), Graduate Center. I was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness from 2017 to 2021. I earned my Ph.D. in Philosophy from the CUNY, Graduate Center, Philosophy Program (2017). I also have an M.A. in Philosophy from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), and a B.A. in Philosophy.

My research interests include the philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of sounds and music. I have work on consciousness, introspection, auditory sensation, the mind-body problem and the knowledge argument. I am also interested in epistemology, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy.

I served on the advisory board of SWIP-Analytic New York (now called SWIP-NYC) from 2018 to 2020, of which I was the director from 2015 to 2017. Additionally, I was the founder and director of SWIP-Analytic México from 2016 to 2019, and co-founder of SWIP-Analytic Spain in 2018. 

 

Find also my profile at ORCID

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Adriana_Renero

https://nyu.academia.edu/AdrianaRenero

Last Update: July 2022.

 
 

Work in progress

I am currently working on “Kripke’s Unpublished Knowledge Argument”

In his unpublished 1979 lectures on the philosophy of mind*, Kripke offers another argument against the physicalist thesis that “one who knows all the physical truths—or all the physical facts—knows everything.” This argument appeals to the auditory domain. In this work, I discuss several cases of deaf people, which Kripke provides, and adapt these into one single case: the deaf person case. Then I claim that this is a precursor of Frank Jackson’s “knowledge argument against physicalism” i.e. the often-quoted “Mary case” (1982). In doing so, I compare and contrast Kripke and Jackson’s cases, and argue that the deaf person case constitutes a more persuasive argument against physicalism. I also show that Kripke offers an account of descriptions of the phenomenal character of auditory experiences and pinpoints important aspects of phenomenal character that Jackson does not address. (Work supervised by Saul Kripke from 2016 to 2022).

Transcriptions of Kripke's Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind (Princeton 1979)* from version I (first revision by SK: July 2016) to version XXII (last revision by SK: April 2022). 

Notes given by SK (July 2022) in process of incorporation to the transcriptions (final version: in progress). 

 I am also working on other papers and/or sections (titles may vary):

"Conceptual Materialism" (development* section 5 of the Knowledge Argument)

"Auditory Consciousness" (development* section 4 of the Knowledge Argument)

"Philosophical Exchanges" (development* section 3 of the Knowledge Argument)

“Experiencing Sound through Time”

“The Routes of Introspection”

"The Value of Introspective Awareness"

“An Integrative Theory of Introspection” (co-author)

Translation of Susanna Siegel's "Affordances and The Contents of Perception" (2014) to Spanish.  

Last update: July 2022

 

Publications See my Philpapers

Click on titles to see pre-print papers or click on journal's name to open journal's site.

 

Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles:

Renero, Adriana and Brown, Richard (2022, forthcoming). A HOROR Theory for Introspective Consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 29, no.11-12.

Abstract: Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one’s higher-order thoughts being conscious, which would require a third-order thought—i.e., a thought about a thought about a mental state. In this work, we offer an alternative account of introspection that builds on the recent Higher-Order Representation of a Representation (HOROR) theory of phenomenal consciousness. According to HOROR theory, phenomenal consciousness consists in having the right kind of higher-order representation. We claim that this theory can be extended to introspection by recognizing that there is a distinctive kind of consciousness—i.e., introspective consciousness—which can be accounted for as the theory does for phenomenal consciousness generally. We call this novel view: Higher-Order Representation Intentionally for Introspective Consciousness (HORIFIC). We argue that there are independent reasons for thinking that introspective consciousness can be either ‘stimuli-induced’ or  ‘self-triggered’ and that one of the benefits of the view we develop is that it can embrace a pluralist approach. Our view also accounts both for which a specific mental state is represented by a particular higher-order representation, and for the way in which we are aware of changes, transitions, and boundaries between mental states in specific cases of introspective consciousness.

Renero, Adriana (2019). Modes of Introspective Access: A pluralist Approach, Philosophia (online version 2018) and Philosophia vol. 47, no. 3: 823–844. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-9989-2 10

Abstract. Several contemporary philosophical theories of introspection have been offered, yet each faces a number of difficulties in providing an explanation of the exact nature of introspection. I contrast the inner-sense view that argues for a causal awareness with the acquaintance view that argues for a non-causal or direct awareness. After critically examining the inner-sense and the acquaintance views, I claim that these two views are complementary and not mutually exclusive, and that both perspectives, conceived of as (what I call)modes of introspective access,actually broaden the notion of introspection. I then propose a useful distinction between (what I call)stimuli-induced introspection—i.e., a receptive process whereby some specific mental states induce introspection—and (what I call)self-triggered introspection—i.e., a selective process whereby the individual’s own interest and volition initiates introspection. I argue that that distinction may eliminate the false dichotomy which claims that only one of those types of awareness, either the causal one or the direct one, is conducive to introspection or is defined as introspection.

Renero, Adriana (2014). Consciousness and Mental Qualities for Auditory SensationsJournal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 21, no. 9-10: 179-204.  https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.21.9.179

Abstract. The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the development of a philosophy of auditory perception; however, none tackle the question of how our consciousness of auditory states arises. My goal is to show how consciousness about our auditory experience gets triggered. I examine a range of auditory mental phenomena to show how we are able to capture qualitative distinctions of auditory sensations. I argue that our consciousness of auditory states consists in having thoughts that organize our experience. Although my proposals could be adapted to fit with other theories of consciousness, here I expand David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory and his quality-space theory, and show their usefulness for analysing our auditory experience. I use quality-space to account for pitch, timbre, loudness, and sound location. I further show that our higher-order thoughts capture qualitative aspects of our auditory sensations. I conclude by demonstrating how a hypothetical listener in possession of a refined vocabulary describes and reports her higher-order thoughts about her musical experience.

Renero, Adriana (2013). Nous and Aisthésis: Two Cognitive Faculties in Aristotle, Méthexis, International Journal for Ancient Philosophy, vol. XXVI: 103-120.​

Abstract. In disagreement with Claudia Baracchi’s controversial thesis that there is a “simultaneity and indissolubility” if not an “identity” of intelligence (nous) and perception (aisthēsis) at the core of Aristotle’s philosophy, I will argue that Aristotle maintains a fundamental distinction between these cognitive faculties.  My goal in this paper is to examine specific parts of two central and complex passages, VI.8, 1142a12-30 and VI.11, 1143a33-b15, from the Nicomachean Ethics to show that Baracchi’s view is unpersuasive.  I will show that Aristotle considers nous to be a different capacity than mere perception and one through which particulars and indemonstrable principles become intelligible.  Moreover, I will show that Aristotle considers that the objects of nous differ in kind from those that sensation (our senses) and perception (inference from our senses) grasp.  After examining critically Baracchi’s thesis in light of a close reading of those two relevant passages, I will conclude the paper by showing the significance of Aristotle’s claim that a state is defined in terms of its objects of apprehension for understanding the distinction between nous and aisthēsis.

Renero, Adriana (2009). Experience and Consciousness: Enhancing the Notion of Musical UnderstandingCrítica, vol. 41, no. 121: 23-46.

 

Abstract. Disagreeing with Jerrold Levinson's claim that being conscious of broad span musical form is not essential to understanding music, I will argue that our awareness of musical architecture is significant to achieve comprehension. I will show that the experiential model is not incompatible with the analytic model. My main goal is to show that these two models can be reconciled through the identification of a broader notion of understanding. After accomplishing this reconciliation by means of my new conception, I will close the paper by discussing some reasons to accept an enhancing notion of musical understanding that includes levels and degrees of understanding.

Chapters in Volumes:

--- With Rohit Parikh (2017). Justified True Belief: Plato, Gettier, and Turing. In Turing 100: Philosophical Explorations of the Legacy of Alan Turing, eds. Juliet Floyd & Alisa Bokulich, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, Springer.

In Spanish:

Click on journal's name to get a PDF version of my paper from the journal's website.

 

Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles:

 

--- (2007). Identidad y entendimiento. Schelling o una instancia intermedia entre Kant y Hegel, En-Claves del Pensamiento, vol. 1, no. 2: 23-45.

--- (2007). La estética de Hegel: reflexión sobre la forma romántica del arte en la catedral gótica, Avatares, vol.10, no. 28: 21-33.

 

--- (2007). Recuerdo y permanencia: una lectura sobre el poema Andenken de Friedrich Hölderlin, Estudios: Filosofía, Historia, Arte, vol. V, no. 81: 109-118.

 

--- (2006) ¿Qué es el límite?, Ciencia y Desarrollo, vol. 32, no. 199: 16-21.

 

--- (2006). Logos, Eros y Poiesis: sobre el poema Quejas de Menón por Diótima de F. Hölderlin, Revista Digital Universitaria UNAM, vol. 7, no. 5:1-12.

 

--- (2005). Psyché y Eros en Platón, Avatares, vol. 8, no. 24: 49-62.

 

--- (2005). La música en los cultos dionisiacos, Intersticios: Filosofía, Arte, Religión, vol. 10, no. 22-23: 259-271. 

 

Chapters in Volumes:

 

--- (2010). Emoción y cognición en música, en Identidad y Diferencia: la filosofía y la ciencia (Labastida y Aréchiga, Eds.), vol. 3, Siglo XXI Editores: 318-24.

 

--- (2007). La noción de límite en el pensamiento de Eugenio Trías, en El saber filosófico: antiguo y moderno (Martínez Contreras y Ponce de León, Eds.), vol. I, Siglo XXI:  207-215.

 

Reviews:

 

--- (2007). "Consideraciones estéticas sobre la hermenéutica de Gadamer” (María Antonia González) Diánoia, vol. LIII, no. 59: 232-41.

 

--- (2005). "Ética y Condición Humana” (Eugenio Trías), Habitar el límite: una aproximación a la ética de Eugenio Trías, Revista Digital Universitaria, UNAM, vol. 6, no. 4: 154.

Last update: July 2022

 

 

Recent (selective) talks

Kripke's Knowledge Argument against Materialism (in Spanish)

CLEPO y Facultad de Filosofía y Sociedad

Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain

The Value of Introspection

Forum for Human Values, Center for Human Values

Princeton University, NJ

The Routes of Introspection

Experiences, Series of Seminars in Philosophy of Mind

University of Liege, Liege, Belgium

Kripke Argument Against Materialism

Saul Kripke Seminar

The Graduate Center, CUNY

How does introspection operate?

Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC 23)

Western University, London, ON Canada, June 25-28

The Routes of Introspection 

Lecture Series

Mira Group, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

A Pluralist Theory of Introspection

III International Seminar on Cognition, Development

& Psychopathology: Subjectivity and Consciousness

CARE Seminar, Universidad del Desarrollo, Chile

Introspection about Decision-Making Process

Workshop on Introspection and Self-knowledge

California State University at Chico     

                                                           

Selective and Voluntary Attention in Introspection

Virtues of Attention Workshop

NYU Shanghai, China                                                                       

Nous and Aisthesis

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas

UNAM, Mexico City

                         

Kripke’s Unpublished Knowledge Argument (presentation with Saul Kripke)

Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness

New York University

 

A New Pluralist Model of Introspection

Harvard Workshop on Mind and Reality and

Philosophy Department UP

Universidad Panamericana, Mexico City

  

Consciencia de estados mentales y procesos

Conferencia Magistral, Facultad de Filosofía

Universidad Panamericana, Mexico City

Addressing Skeptical Challenges to Introspection

Centre for Philosophical Psychology

University of Antwerp, Belgium (paper submitted)                                         

Kripke’s Unpublished Knowledge Argument

The Saul Kripke Center                                                                    CUNY, the Graduate Center

 

The Deaf Person Case

Tokyo Colloquium of Cognitive Philosophy

and the Tokyo Forum for Analytic Philosophy

University of Tokyo, Japan

Sounds and Auditory Experience (the starting point

of Kripke's Knowledge Argument)

Colors, Sounds, Numbers, Names, Inferences, Minds

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, CDMX

                                                                 

Sep, 2022

 

Nov, 2021

 

 

June, 2021

 

April, 2021

June, 2019

April, 2019

Nov, 2018

 

April, 2018

 

March, 2018

Jan, 2018

 

Dec, 2017

 

Nov, 2017

 

 

Aug, 2017

 

May, 2017

 

May, 2017

Dec, 2016

Aug, 2016

 
 
Contact me

 

New York University

Department of Philosophy

Broadway Block, 5 Washington Pl, New York, NY 10003. 

adriana.renero[at]nyu.edu

The Saul Kripke Center, CUNY,

Graduate Center

365 Fifth Ave. Room 7118,

New York, NY 10016.

arenero[at]gc.cuny.edu

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© 2017 by Adriana Renero / Philosopher