Publications See my Philpapers

Click on titles to see pre-print papers or click on journal's name to open journal's site.

Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles:

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Renero, Adriana and Brown, Richard (2022, forthcoming). A HOROR Theory for Introspective Consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 29, no.11-12.

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Abstract: Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one’s higher-order thoughts being conscious, which would require a third-order thought—i.e., a thought about a thought about a mental state. In this work, we offer an alternative account of introspection that builds on the recent Higher-Order Representation of a Representation (HOROR) theory of phenomenal consciousness. According to HOROR theory, phenomenal consciousness consists in having the right kind of higher-order representation. We claim that this theory can be extended to introspection by recognizing that there is a distinctive kind of consciousness—i.e., introspective consciousness—which can be accounted for as the theory does for phenomenal consciousness generally. We call this novel view: Higher-Order Representation Intentionally for Introspective Consciousness (HORIFIC). We argue that there are independent reasons for thinking that introspective consciousness can be either ‘stimuli-induced’ or  ‘self-triggered’ and that one of the benefits of the view we develop is that it can embrace a pluralist approach. Our view also accounts both for which a specific mental state is represented by a particular higher-order representation, and for the way in which we are aware of changes, transitions, and boundaries between mental states in specific cases of introspective consciousness.

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Renero, Adriana (2019). Modes of Introspective Access: A pluralist Approach, Philosophia (online version 2018) and Philosophia vol. 47, no. 3: 823–844. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-9989-2 10. 

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Abstract. Several contemporary philosophical theories of introspection have been offered, yet each faces a number of difficulties in providing an explanation of the exact nature of introspection. I contrast the inner-sense view that argues for a causal awareness with the acquaintance view that argues for a non-causal or direct awareness. After critically examining the inner-sense and the acquaintance views, I claim that these two views are complementary and not mutually exclusive, and that both perspectives, conceived of as (what I call)modes of introspective access,actually broaden the notion of introspection. I then propose a useful distinction between (what I call)stimuli-induced introspection—i.e., a receptive process whereby some specific mental states induce introspection—and (what I call)self-triggered introspection—i.e., a selective process whereby the individual’s own interest and volition initiates introspection. I argue that that distinction may eliminate the false dichotomy which claims that only one of those types of awareness, either the causal one or the direct one, is conducive to introspection or is defined as introspection.

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Renero, Adriana (2014). Consciousness and Mental Qualities for Auditory Sensations, Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 21, no. 9-10: 179-204.  https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.21.9.179

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Abstract. The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the development of a philosophy of auditory perception; however, none tackle the question of how our consciousness of auditory states arises. My goal is to show how consciousness about our auditory experience gets triggered. I examine a range of auditory mental phenomena to show how we are able to capture qualitative distinctions of auditory sensations. I argue that our consciousness of auditory states consists in having thoughts that organize our experience. Although my proposals could be adapted to fit with other theories of consciousness, here I expand David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory and his quality-space theory, and show their usefulness for analysing our auditory experience. I use quality-space to account for pitch, timbre, loudness, and sound location. I further show that our higher-order thoughts capture qualitative aspects of our auditory sensations. I conclude by demonstrating how a hypothetical listener in possession of a refined vocabulary describes and reports her higher-order thoughts about her musical experience.

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Renero, Adriana (2013). Nous and Aisthésis: Two Cognitive Faculties in Aristotle, Méthexis, International Journal for Ancient Philosophy, vol. XXVI: 103-120.​

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Abstract. In disagreement with Claudia Baracchi’s controversial thesis that there is a “simultaneity and indissolubility” if not an “identity” of intelligence (nous) and perception (aisthēsis) at the core of Aristotle’s philosophy, I will argue that Aristotle maintains a fundamental distinction between these cognitive faculties.  My goal in this paper is to examine specific parts of two central and complex passages, VI.8, 1142a12-30 and VI.11, 1143a33-b15, from the Nicomachean Ethics to show that Baracchi’s view is unpersuasive.  I will show that Aristotle considers nous to be a different capacity than mere perception and one through which particulars and indemonstrable principles become intelligible.  Moreover, I will show that Aristotle considers that the objects of nous differ in kind from those that sensation (our senses) and perception (inference from our senses) grasp.  After examining critically Baracchi’s thesis in light of a close reading of those two relevant passages, I will conclude the paper by showing the significance of Aristotle’s claim that a state is defined in terms of its objects of apprehension for understanding the distinction between nous and aisthēsis.

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Renero, Adriana (2009). Experience and Consciousness: Enhancing the Notion of Musical Understanding, Crítica, vol. 41, no. 121: 23-46.

Abstract. Disagreeing with Jerrold Levinson's claim that being conscious of broad span musical form is not essential to understanding music, I will argue that our awareness of musical architecture is significant to achieve comprehension. I will show that the experiential model is not incompatible with the analytic model. My main goal is to show that these two models can be reconciled through the identification of a broader notion of understanding. After accomplishing this reconciliation by means of my new conception, I will close the paper by discussing some reasons to accept an enhancing notion of musical understanding that includes levels and degrees of understanding.

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Chapters in Volumes:

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--- With Rohit Parikh (2017). Justified True Belief: Plato, Gettier, and Turing. In Turing 100: Philosophical Explorations of the Legacy of Alan Turing, eds. Juliet Floyd & Alisa Bokulich, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, Springer.

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In Spanish:

Click on journal's name to get a PDF version of my paper from the journal's website.

Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles:

--- (2007). Identidad y entendimiento. Schelling o una instancia intermedia entre Kant y Hegel, En-Claves del Pensamiento, vol. 1, no. 2: 23-45.

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--- (2007). La estética de Hegel: reflexión sobre la forma romántica del arte en la catedral gótica, Avatares, vol.10, no. 28: 21-33.

--- (2007). Recuerdo y permanencia: una lectura sobre el poema Andenken de Friedrich Hölderlin, Estudios: Filosofía, Historia, Arte, vol. V, no. 81: 109-118.

--- (2006) ¿Qué es el límite?, Ciencia y Desarrollo, vol. 32, no. 199: 16-21.

--- (2006). Logos, Eros y Poiesis: sobre el poema Quejas de Menón por Diótima de F. Hölderlin, Revista Digital Universitaria UNAM, vol. 7, no. 5:1-12.

--- (2005). Psyché y Eros en Platón, Avatares, vol. 8, no. 24: 49-62.

--- (2005). La música en los cultos dionisiacos, Intersticios: Filosofía, Arte, Religión, vol. 10, no. 22-23: 259-271. 

Chapters in Volumes:

--- (2010). Emoción y cognición en música, en Identidad y Diferencia: la filosofía y la ciencia (Labastida y Aréchiga, Eds.), vol. 3, Siglo XXI Editores: 318-24.

--- (2007). La noción de límite en el pensamiento de Eugenio Trías, en El saber filosófico: antiguo y moderno (Martínez Contreras y Ponce de León, Eds.), vol. I, Siglo XXI:  207-215.

Reviews:

--- (2007). "Consideraciones estéticas sobre la hermenéutica de Gadamer” (María Antonia González) Diánoia, vol. LIII, no. 59: 232-41.

--- (2005). "Ética y Condición Humana” (Eugenio Trías), Habitar el límite: una aproximación a la ética de Eugenio Trías, Revista Digital Universitaria, UNAM, vol. 6, no. 4: 154.

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Last update: July 2022

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