Recent AbstracTS
Hey There
Telling just what we know: Revisiting Nisbett and Wilson’s stocking case
Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) classic study in social cognition, the so-called “stocking case”, is a long-lasting authority that has often been interpreted as providing empirical support for the claim that introspection regarding mental processes such as the decision-making process is untrustworthy. In this article, I argue that such interpretations fail to identify the appropriate targets of introspection or appropriate object of criticism, thus leading to the emergence of several skeptical views. I show that researchers erroneously view the psychological causes of mental processes, rather than the processes themselves, as the targets of introspection and erroneously equate introspection about the decision-making process with mechanisms such as reasoning and retrospection. Therefore, skeptical views concerning the trustworthiness of introspection about the decision-making process ultimately commit two fallacies pertaining to – what I call – equivocal targets and equivocal mechanisms. (Forthcoming in Philosophy)
Kripke’s knowledge argument against materialism
In his unpublished 1979 Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, Saul Kripke offers a knowledge argument against materialism focusing on deaf people who lack knowledge of auditory experience. Kripke’s argument is a precursor of Frank Jackson’s better-known knowledge argument against materialism (1982). The paper sets out Kripke’s argument, brings out its interest and philosophical importance, and explores some similarities and differences between Kripke’s knowledge argument and Jackson’s. Published in Philosophical Perspectives https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12195
A HOROR Theory for Introspective Consciousness
Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one’s higher-order thoughts being conscious, which would require a third-order thought — i.e. a thought about a thought about a mental state. In this work, we offer an alternative account of introspection that builds on the recent Higher-Order Representation of a Representation (HOROR) theory of phenomenal consciousness. According to HOROR theory, phenomenal consciousness consists in having the right kind of higher-order representation. We claim that this theory can be extended to introspection by recognizing that there is a distinctive kind of consciousness — i.e. introspective consciousness — which can be accounted for as the theory does for phenomenal consciousness generally. We call this novel view: Higher-Order Representation Intentionally For Introspective Consciousness (HORIFIC). We argue that there are independent reasons for thinking that introspective consciousness can be either ‘stimuli-induced’ or ‘self-triggered’ and that one of the benefits of the view we develop is that it can embrace a pluralist approach. Our view also accounts for what specific mental state is represented by a particular higher-order representation, and for the way in which we are aware of changes, transitions, and boundaries between mental states in specific cases of introspective consciousness. (with Richard Brown), Published in JCS https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.11.155
THE ROUTES OF INTROsPECTION
In ‘What Forms Could Introspective Systems Take? A Research Programme’, Kammerer and Frankish aim to map the space of ‘possible forms of introspection’ while lending themselves to questions about how different kinds of minds represent themselves. This paper aligns with their research programme in embracing other possible forms of introspection; it provides an outline of how, in representing its mental states, an introspective system could take a selective, cumulative, and/or predictive route while underscoring the importance of considering routes of introspection. Although this work only explores human minds, it contributes to Kammerer and Frankish’s research programme by providing a path to studying new methods of introspection and their possible application to other kinds of minds. Published in JCS https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.9.174
modes of INTROspective acess
Several contemporary philosophical theories of introspection have been offered, yet each faces a number of difficulties in providing an explanation of the exact nature of introspection. I contrast the inner-sense view that argues for a causal awareness with the acquaintance view that argues for a non-causal or direct awareness. After critically examining the inner-sense and the acquaintance views, I claim that these two views are complementary and not mutually exclusive, and that both perspectives, conceived of as (what I call) modes of introspective access, actually broaden the notion of introspection. I then propose a useful distinction between (what I call) stimuli-induced introspection—i.e., a receptive process whereby some specific mental states induce introspection—and (what I call) self-triggered introspection—i.e., a selective process whereby the individual’s own interest and volition initiates introspection. I argue that that distinction may eliminate the false dichotomy which claims that only one of those types of awareness, either the causal one or the direct one, is conducive to introspection or is defined as introspection. Published in Philosophia https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-9989-2 10